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Abstract
A binary iriscode is a very compact representation of an iris image. For a long
time it was assumed that the iriscode did not contain enough information to al-
low for the reconstruction of the original iris. The present work proposes a novel
probabilistic approach based on genetic algorithms to reconstruct iris images from
binary templates and analyzes the similarity between the reconstructed synthetic
iris image and the original one. The performance of the reconstruction technique
is assessed by empirically estimating the probability of successfully matching the
synthesized iris image against its true counterpart using a commercial matcher.
The experimental results indicate that the reconstructed images look reasonably
realistic. While a human expert may not be easily deceived by them, they can suc-
cessfully deceive a commercial matcher. Furthermore, since the proposed method-
ology is able to synthesize multiple iris images from a single iriscode, it has other
potential applications including privacy enhancement of iris-based systems.
Keywords: Image reconstruction, Biometric systems, Iris recognition, Binary
iriscodes, Security, Privacy
Email addresses: javier.galbally@uam.es (Javier Galbally),
arun.ross@mail.wvu.edu (Arun Ross), marta.barrero@uam.es (Marta
Gomez-Barrero), julian.fierrez@uam.es (Julian Fierrez), javier.ortega@uam.es
(Javier Ortega-Garcia)
Preprint submitted to Computer Vision and Image Understanding April 10, 2013
1. Introduction
Biometrics is the science of establishing human identity based on the phys-
ical and behavioral attributes of an individual such as fingerprints, face, iris or
voice. Since biometric traits are inherently associated with a person, they offer
substantial advantages over traditional human authentication schemes based on
passwords and ID cards [1, 2]. Consequently, the deployment of biometric sys-
tems in identity management and access control applications is on the increase.
A classical biometric system acquires the biometric trait of an individual, ex-
tracts salient features from the trait, and compares the extracted features against
those in a database in order to verify a claimed identity or to identify an individ-
ual. For security and privacy reasons, biometric systems typically do not store
the raw biometric data that may disclose sensitive information about the subjects
(i.e., race, diseases, etc.). Rather, they store the extracted template (feature set)
containing the most discriminative information about the individual and relevant
for recognition purposes. However, recent research has looked into the possibility
of recovering the original biometric data from the reduced template [3, 4]. Such
studies, which are also relevant from an information theory perspective (i.e., what
is the amount of information necessary to reverse engineer a biometric template?),
have set a new research trend in the biometrics field known as inverse biometrics.
The present work falls under this category.
Among the various biometric traits that have been researched and used, iris
is traditionally regarded as one of the most reliable and accurate [5]. After some
preprocessing steps in which the iris is localized, segmented and normalized, the
vast majority of iris recognition systems perform some type of filtering operation
in order to generate the iris template (e.g., using 2-D Gabor wavelets). The phase
information of the filtered normalized image is quantized to produce the final
binary template (i.e., iriscode) which is stored in the database during enrollment.
Then, in the authentication or recognition phase, iriscodes are compared using
bit-based metrics like the Hamming distance [6, 7, 8]. This way iris recognition
is accomplished based only on phase-related information, while the amplitude
data is discarded due to its sensitivity to external factors such as imaging contrast,
illumination or camera gain.
The iriscode has been adopted as a de facto standard by most iris-based sys-
tems, as it is a very efficient and compact representation of the discriminative
characteristics contained within a person’s iris pattern. It has been a common
belief in the biometric community that binary templates do not have sufficient
information to reconstruct the original iris image from them [9]. Furthermore,
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iriscodes from real iris images have been demonstrated to be significantly unique
across individuals [10].
Are iriscodes really resilient to being reverse-engineered in order to recover
the original iris pattern from them? Is it possible to generate different synthetic
iris-like patterns which yield iriscodes very similar to the one given? In summary,
can we generate synthetic images that match a specific binary template thereby
potentially deceiving an iris recognition system?
In the present work we address these questions by proposing a novel proba-
bilistic approach based on genetic algorithms for the generation of iris-like syn-
thetic patterns whose corresponding iriscodes match that of a genuine user. Two
main goals are pursued:
 On the one hand, explore whether the phase information embedded in the
iriscode is sufficient to reconstruct an iris image that can be successfully
matched to the real one from which the template was generated. As a val-
idation of the proposed reconstruction approach, we will investigate if the
synthetically produced images may be used to deceive state-of-the-art com-
mercial matchers.
 On the other hand, determine if it is possible to generate not just one, but
a class of synthetic patterns with very similar iriscodes to that of a real
one (i.e., exhibiting similarities in phase but differences in magnitude with
respect to the original genuine pattern). As a validation of this second ob-
jective, we will determine if producing more than one reconstructed sample
results in a better chance of deceiving iris recognition systems.
If the aforementioned goals are realized, it would imply that it is possible
to generate synthetic iris images that are visually different from the original iris
sample but which produce iriscodes that fall within the intra-class tolerance of a
genuine user.
The work has been carried out from a computer-based perspective. This means
that our goal is not to generate iris images that could fool a human expert; rather,
the goal is to successfully match the synthesized iris images with their true coun-
terparts using an automated iris matcher. Even so, different strategies to make the
synthetic patterns look as realistic as possible are also explored in the experimen-
tal part of the article, where statistical results regarding the visual perception that
experts and non-experts have of the reconstructed image are presented.
In order to provide a fully reproducible experimental protocol, which permits
the comparison of the results with future studies, experiments are carried out on
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two publicly available databases. Furthermore, the iris recognition systems used
for development and testing are well known matchers that can be easily obtained
by any interested party.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Related work is discussed
in Sect. 2. The concept of automated iris recognition is briefly summarized in
Sect. 3. The proposed iris reconstruction algorithm is presented in Sect. 4. The
databases and iris matchers used in the experimental protocol are described in
Sect. 5. The performance of the proposed approach is reported and analyzed in
Sect. 6, while results evaluating the visual realism of the reconstructed images are
given in Sect. 7. A preliminary quality assessment of the synthesized iris images
is presented in Sect. 8. Conclusions are drawn in Sect. 9.
2. Related Work and Contributions
Recently, several researchers have addressed the problem of generating differ-
ent synthetic biometric traits such as iris [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], fingerprints [16],
signature [17, 18], face [19], handwriting [20], and voice [21]. All these efforts
have been mainly focused on the generation of new synthetic data, intended in
general to overcome the limitation of assembling large biometric databases for
performance assessment purposes. However, none of these very valuable efforts
directly addresses the main objective of the present work, that is, the reconstruc-
tion of a synthetic biometric sample from a raw genuine template and an evalua-
tion of the ensuing security implications.
In one of the earliest works on image reconstruction from templates, Hill [22]
reported an experiment that challenged the notion of non-reversibility of finger-
print minutiae templates. His study suggested that the information contained in
minutiae templates might allow for the reconstruction of images that are somewhat
similar to the original fingerprints. Since that pioneer study, various researchers
have successfully undertaken the challenge of generating a fingerprint image from
minutiae points alone [3, 23]. More recently, researchers have succeeded in man-
ufacturing a gummy finger from minutiae templates [24].
In the context of face recognition, different approaches have been used by
researchers to reconstruct face images from raw templates [25, 26, 4, 27].
In the context of iris recognition, a very recent study has been the first to
address the problem of generating iris images from binary iriscodes [28]. In this
work, the authors take advantage of the prior knowledge of the feature extraction
scheme used by the recognition system (i.e., functions defining the filters used
during feature extraction) in order to reverse engineer the iriscode. Then, real
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images are used to impart a more realistic appearance to the synthetic iris patterns
generated.
The differences between the deterministic technique described in [28] and the
probabilistic method proposed in the present study will be pointed out throughout
the article. However, the most important differences are as follows:
 Type of approach. In [28], given an iriscode and a fixed set of parameter
values, the resulting reconstructed synthetic pattern is always the same (i.e.,
deterministic approach). Our methodology permits the reconstruction of po-
tentially a large number of synthetic iris patterns with very similar iriscodes
(i.e., probabilistic approach). As will be shown in the experimental part
of the work, having more than one synthetic iris significantly increases the
chances of matching against the true counterparts. Furthermore, apart from
security-related studies such as the one carried out in the present paper, the
proposed probabilistic method presents other potential applications that will
be discussed in Sect. 9.
 Knowledge required. In the development stage, the method proposed in
[28] requires knowledge of the feature extraction scheme being used by
the recognition system. On the other hand, our technique only requires the
output score of an iris matcher to reconstruct the image and does not need
any prior information about how the recognition system obtains that score.
 Images required. In order to generate somewhat realistic iris-like patterns,
the algorithm described in [28] relies on information from real iris images.
No original samples are needed in the present study to obtain realistic-
looking synthetic images.
 Experimental protocol. Although consistent, the experimental protocol
followed in [28] does not allow for the comparison of its results with other
methods, as the iris matchers used for development and validation are pro-
prietary implementations and not publicly available. In the present work,
the experimental protocol has been designed to be fully reproducible (i.e.,
publicly available databases and matchers are used) so that an objective
comparison may be carried out with other reconstruction approaches pro-
posed in the future.
A great deal of attention has been given recently to another key area directly
related to the present work: evaluating the security of biometric systems. Many
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different researchers have addressed the vulnerabilities of biometric systems to
spoofing attacks (those carried out at the sensor level using, for instance, a gummy
finger or a printed iris image) [29], [30, 31], [32], and to software-based attacks
(carried out against some of the internal modules of the system) [33, 27, 34].
Furthermore, the interest in the analysis of system vulnerabilities has permeated
the scientific field and different standardization initiatives at the international level
have emerged in order to deal with the problem of security evaluation in biometric
systems, such as the Common Criteria [35] and its associated Biometric Evalua-
tion Methodology BEM [36] or the ISO/IEC-19792:2009 for biometric security
evaluation [37].
This new concern which has arisen in the biometric community regarding
the security of biometric systems has also led to the initiation of several inter-
national projects, like the European Tabula Rasa [38], which involves the joint
effort of researchers, developers and evaluators to improve this technology using
the security-through-transparency principle: in order to make biometric systems
more secure and reliable, their vulnerabilities need to be detected and analyzed so
that useful countermeasures may be developed.
Following the same transparency principle which is beginning to prevail in
the biometric community, the most significant contributions of the present work
compared to those previously mentioned in this section are: i) proposal of a novel
genetic-based probabilistic approach for the reconstruction of iris patterns from
their iriscodes, ii) evaluation of the vulnerabilities of a commercial iris matcher to
different attacks carried out with the reconstructed iris images using a systematic
and reproducible experimental protocol, and iii) demonstration of the feasibility
of generating multiple synthetic iris patterns with similar iriscodes to that of a real
iris image.
3. Summary of Iris Recognition
The objective of this section is to briefly summarize those aspects of an iris
recognition system which are directly related to the present study and which are
essential for the correct understanding of the work. For a more comprehensive,
descriptive and self-contained review on automatic iris recognition the reader is
referred to [10, 7, 39, 40, 41, 42].
Common iris recognition systems comprise of five different stages: image ac-
quisition, iris location and segmentation, normalization, encoding and matching.
As has been mentioned before, the main objective of this work is to reconstruct an
iris pattern from its encoded binary template. Thus, although the acquisition and
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Figure 1: Example illustrating the segmentation (a), the normalization and occlusion mask (b),
and the encoding (c) stages used by most iris recognition systems.
segmentation tasks may be very challenging under certain scenarios (e.g., long
distance acquisition, uncontrolled lighting conditions, eye deviation, etc.) they
are not relevant to this study and will not be treated here.
 Normalization. Once the iris has been segmented, the vast majority of iris
recognition systems transform the annular-like iris pattern in cartesian co-
ordinates to a normalized rectangular image of fixed dimensions in pseudo-
polar coordinates. These are the type of images that will be reconstructed
using the algorithm described in this work. The normalization process may
be reversed and the normalized iris patterns can be incorporated again into
the original eye images (of the same or of a different user).
 Encoding. Although a number of methods have been reported in this stage,
most of them use some type of filtering strategy (typically based on Gabor
Wavelet filters) prior to quantizing the phasor response of the filtered output
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Figure 2: General diagram of the scheme followed in the present work. A detailed diagram of
the reconstruction approach (dashed rectangle) is given in Fig. 3 where points A and B show,
respectively, the input and output of the algorithm.
resulting in a binary representation of the iris image (i.e., the iriscode).
Finally, two iriscodes are compared using a bitwise operator such as the Ham-
ming distance. In most cases, in the segmentation stage, a mask showing the
occluded areas of the iris (e.g., due to the eyelids or eyelashes) is also generated.
Thus, the matching score is only computed using the “non-masked” bits of the
iriscode.
In Fig. 1 an example of the normalization and encoding stages is shown. The
original iris image appears on top (a) with the two white circles denoting the outer
and inner boundaries of the segmented iris. The corresponding normalized image
along with the mask indicating the occluded areas (b) and the final iriscode (c) are
also shown.
4. The Reconstruction Method
To extend formality to the problem being addressed, some mathematical nota-
tions are introduced in this section.Let B represent the iriscode of the user whose
iris image is being reconstructed, IR represent the reconstructed normalized iris
image which is a solution to the problem, BR be its associated iriscode and  the
matching threshold that determines if two iris images are of the same eye.
Problem statement. Consider a RC dimensional matrix IR of real values,
which is divided intoHL square blocks of dimensionR=HC=L, withH  R
and L  C. This matrix is mapped by some unknown function F to a binary
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Figure 3: Diagram of the probabilistic method proposed in the present work for the reconstruction
of iris images from their iriscode. Points A and B (input and output of the reconstruction algorithm
respectively) may be seen for reference in Fig. 2. As is shown in the shaded chart in the center of
the figure, although individuals are represented as vectors for simplicity, strictly they are matrices
of size R C pixels divided into H  L blocks.
matrix BR (i.e., BR = F(IR)) of dimensions K W (K is a multiple of R and
W is a multiple of C).
Consider the problem of finding an IR matrix such that, its associated BR
matrix (unknown), produces a similarity score (s) greater than a certain threshold
, when it is compared to a known binary matrix B according to some unknown
matching function J , i.e., J (B;BR) > .
For clarity, we will define a new function V as: V(B; IR) = J (B;F(IR)) =
J (B;BR) = s
Assumptions. Let us assume that we have access to the evaluation of the
function V(B; IR) for several trials of IR.
Algorithm. The problem stated above may be solved using a genetic algo-
rithm to optimize the similarity score given by the system, according to the gen-
eral diagram shown in Fig. 2. Genetic algorithms, which have shown remarkable
performance in optimization problems [43], are search methods that iteratively
apply certain rules inspired by biological evolution to a population of individuals
(possible solutions) according to a given fitness function. During each iteration
the algorithmmoves towards better solutions in terms of the fitness function which
has to be optimized. In our particular problem, the following observations ought
to be made.
 The fitness value associated with each individual (normalized iris image) is
the matching score, s = V(B; IR).
 Usually genetic algorithms operate with individuals that are binary vectors.
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In this problem, the genetic algorithm has been modified to work with ma-
trices of real values (i.e., IR) where each of the H  L blocks represents a
gene of the individual.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, the steps followed by the reconstruction algorithm
are:
1. Generate an initial population P0 with N individuals of size R  C (i.e.,
dimensions of the normalized iris images), and tessellate each individual
into H  L rectangular blocks.
2. Compute the similarity scores si of the individuals (IRi) of the population
P0, si = V(B; IRi), with i = 1; : : : ; N .
3. Four rules are used at each iteration to create the next generation Pn of
individuals from the current population:
(a) Elite: The two individuals with the maximum similarity scores are
retained unaltered for the next generation.
(b) Selection: Certain individuals, the parents, are chosen by stochastic
universal sampling [44]. Therefore, the individuals with the highest
fitness values (similarity scores) are more likely to be selected as par-
ents for the next generation: one subject can be selected 0 or many
times. From the originalN individuals, onlyN  2 are eligible (as the
best two are retained as elite) from whichN=2 1 fathers andN=2 1
mothers are chosen.
(c) Crossover: Parents are combined to form N   2 children for the next
generation by employing a scattered crossover method: a random bi-
nary matrix of sizeHL is created and the genes (blocks) for the first
child are selected from the first parent if the value of an entry is 1, and
from the second when it is 0 (vice-versa for the second child).
(d) Mutation: Random changes are applied to the blocks of the new chil-
dren with a mutation probability pm. When a certain block is selected
for mutation, the equivalent block in the individual of the population
with the highest fitness value is changed.
4. Redefine P0 = Pn and return to step 2.
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the best fitness score of
the individuals in the population is higher than the threshold  (i.e., the image has
been successfully reconstructed), ii) the variation of the similarity scores obtained
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in successive generations is lower than a previously fixed value, or iii) when the
maximum number of generations (iterations) is exceeded.
Criteria ii and iii are set in order to prevent an infinite loop in case condition
i is not reached. In the particular case of the experiments described in Sec. 6 the
first criterion was always met (i.e., all images were successfully reconstructed).
Additional note. There are some important characteristics of the reconstruc-
tion method presented above that should be highlighted as they differentiate it
from other previously published iris reconstruction techniques [28]:
 Due to the probabilistic nature of the four rules being applied, the algorithm
produces different solutions at each execution, even when the initialization
and parameter values are the same. This facilitates the reconstruction of
multiple normalized iris images (IR) whose iriscodes (BR) are very similar
to the target (B).
 The algorithm does not require prior knowledge of the mapping function F
between the normalized iris images (IR) and their corresponding iriscodes
(BR).
 The algorithm does not require knowledge of the matching function J .
 The algorithm does not require knowledge of the function V , but just its
output to the given inputs.
 No real iris images are involved in the reconstruction process. As will be
explained in Sect. 5, the initial population P0 is taken from a database of
fully synthetic iris images.
A genetic search algorithmwas used in this work, since the nature of the search
space is unknown to us. Specifically, it is not clear if the objective function results
in a smooth or even a continuous search space. Consequently, the efficiency of
classical stochastic gradient descent methods would be at least unclear. Although
previous work in [45] partially supports the assumption of smoothness/continuity,
this could not be easily substantiated in our case. Therefore, by simultaneously
searching for multiple solutions in the solution space, genetic algorithms are more
likely to avoid potential minima or even plateaus in the search space (much like
simulated annealing schemes).
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Figure 4: Diagram of the experimental protocol followed in the present work. The databases and
systems used are highlighted with a darker shade. The protocol is described in Sects. 5 and 6.
5. Experimental Protocol: Databases and Systems
As shown in Fig. 4 the experimental protocol is divided into a development
stage and a validation stage, where two different databases and two different iris
matchers have been used in order to ensure unbiased results. The databases and
iris matchers are publicly available and so the results obtained in this study are
fully reproducible and may be compared with other methods in the future.
5.1. Databases
Two databases, one containing real iris samples and another containing syn-
thetic samples, are used in the experiments. The iris images to be reconstructed are
taken from the real database (Biosecure DB), while the synthetic dataset (SDB) is
used for the initialization of the reconstruction algorithm (see Fig. 4).
As was described in Sect. 4, the reconstruction method proposed in the present
work needs a set of iris images for its initialization. This pool of initial samples
is taken from a database of fully synthetic iris images for two main reasons: on
the one hand, this avoids any possible overlap between the reconstructed images
and those used in the reconstruction process (which could lead to overoptimistic
results), and, on the other hand, it avoids the need for using real iris images in the
reconstruction method.
 The real database: Biosecure DB. The real images to be reconstructed
in the experiments are taken from the iris corpus included in the Desktop
Dataset of the multimodal BioSecure database [46] that contains voice, fin-
gerprints, face, iris, signature and hand data of 210 subjects, captured in
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Figure 5: Examples of iris images from the two databases used in the experiments: real (top) and
synthetic (bottom).
two time-separated acquisition sessions. This database was acquired by the
joint effort of 11 European institutions and has become one of the standard
benchmarks for biometric performance and security evaluations [47]. It is
publicly available through the BioSecure Foundation1.
The database consists of three datasets captured under different acquisition
scenarios: i) Internet Dataset (DS1, captured through the Internet in an un-
supervised setup), ii) Desktop Dataset (DS2, captured in an office-like en-
vironment with human supervision), and iii) the Mobile Dataset (DS3, ac-
quired using mobile devices withinuncontrolled conditions). The iris subset
used in this work includes four grey-scale images (two per session) per eye,
all captured using the Iris Access EOU3000 sensor from LG. In the experi-
ments the two eyes of each subject have been considered as separate users,
resulting in a total of 210 2 4 = 1; 680 iris samples.
 The synthetic database: SDB. Being a database that contains only fully
synthetic data, it is not subjected to any legal constraints and is publicly
available through the CITeR research center2.
The synthetic irises are generated following the method described in [13],
1http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB
2http://www.citer.wvu.edu/
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which has two stages. In the first stage, a Markov Random Field model is
used to generate a background texture representing the global iris appear-
ance [12]. In the next stage, a variety of iris features such as radial and
concentric furrows, collarette and crypts, are generated and embedded in
the texture field. The database includes seven grey-scale images of 1,000
different subjects.
Typical examples of the eye images that can be found in Biosecure DS2 (top)
and SDB (bottom) are shown in Fig. 5. We can observe that the samples in both
datasets are totally different: this underscores our intention to avoid biased results.
5.2. Iris recognition systems
Two different iris matchers are used in the experiments (see Fig. 4). The first
one, consisting of fully accessible software modules, is used as the development
system for the reconstruction of the iris images. The second one, completely
independent from the previous one, is used in the validation stage in order to
match the reconstructed images against the real ones.
 Development: LogGabor filter-based [48]. In the development stage,
where iris images are reconstructed from real iriscodes, a modified version
of the iris matcher developed by Masek [48] is used. This system was se-
lected for several reasons: i) it is publicly available and its source code may
be freely downloaded3, ii) although its performance is certainly lower than
that of current state-of-the-art iris recognition systems, it is widely used in
many iris-related publications to give baseline results, and iii) it is parti-
tioned into independent software modules that permit access to the match-
ing score (needed by the proposed reconstruction method).
In Masek’s matcher, the different stages involved in iris recognition (de-
scribed in Sect. 3) are implemented following a classical approach: i) seg-
mentation, the method proposed in [49] is followed, modeling the iris and
pupil boundaries as circles; ii) normalization, a technique based on Daug-
man’s rubber sheet model that maps the segmented iris region into a 2D
array is used [7]; iii) feature encoding, produces a binary template of 20
480 = 9; 600 bits by filtering the normalized iris pattern with 1D Log-Gabor
3www.csse.uwa.edu.au/pk/studentprojects/libor/sourcecode.html
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wavelets and quantizing the filtered output to four levels (i.e., two bits) ac-
cording to [7]; and iv) matching, a modified Hamming distance that takes
into account the noise mask bits is used.
 Validation: VeriEye [50]. For the validation experiments, the VeriEye
commercial matcher marketed by Neurotechnology4 is used to determine
the matching potential of the reconstructed iris images. The motivation for
its selection is two-fold: i) it was ranked among the top performing match-
ers in the NIST Iris Exchange (IREX) independent evaluation in 2009 [51],
and, ii) being a commercial matcher it works as a black-box for the user,
who has no knowledge of the algorithms used in any of the stages of the
iris recognition process (being a commercial matchers its implementation
details are proprietary). Therefore, the results of our proposed method are
ensured to be unbiased and not due to a specific adaptation of the recon-
struction algorithm to a given validation system.
6. Results: Performance
Besides avoiding biased results, the experimental framework has been de-
signed to evaluate the performance of the reconstruction algorithm and its compli-
ance with the main objectives set in this work: i) can the iris images reconstructed
using the proposed method be successfully matched with the original iris counter-
part? (main goal of the present work), ii) can the reconstruction scheme synthe-
size different iris-like patterns whose iriscodes are very similar to the original real
iris? (secondary goal of the present work).
6.1. Development experiments: LogGabor filter-based system
The objectives of this first set of experiments are: i) to fix the values of the
different parameters involved in the reconstruction algorithm and, ii) (once the
parameters have been set) to reconstruct the real iris images in Biosecure DB
starting from their iriscodes.
In order to achieve these two goals, one sample of each of the 420 users present
in the Biosecure DB (right and left irises of 210 subjects) were randomly selected
and their iriscode computed according to the publicly available iris recognition
system developed by Masek [48]. The dimensions of the normalized iris images
4http://www.neurotechnology.com/verieye.html
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Figure 6: Genuine and impostor score distributions of the iris matcher used in the development
experiments. The selected positive matching threshold is marked with a vertical dotted line,  =
0:3.
produced by this system areRC = 20240 and the size of their corresponding
binary templates K W = 20 480 (i.e., each pixel is coded with two bits).
In order to determine the parameter values of the genetic algorithm effectively,
certain general guidelines should be taken into account. Probably, the key factor
is to determine the population size. On the one hand, if it is too small the risk of
converging prematurely to a local minima is increased since the population does
not have enough genetic material to sufficiently cover the problem space (i.e., the
diversity is too low). On the other hand, a larger population has a greater chance
of finding the global optimum at the expense of drastically increasing the compu-
tation load (i.e., CPU time) as the number of iterations needed for convergence is
greater.
In most GA-related solutions, the individual’s size (i.e., number of blocksH
L) is determined by the problem at hand. However, in our specific case, the same
reasoning used for the population size applies to the individual’s dimensions as
well. Therefore, for this particular problem, a good balance must be obtained
between both parameters. As a general rule of thumb, in this specific case, good
results are usually obtained when N ' L.
Besides the aforementioned trade-off, in most GA-related problems the muta-
tion probability is usually kept below 1% in order to avoid losing diversity.
With these general principles in mind, extensive experiments were undertaken
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Figure 7: Three example executions (right) of the reconstruction algorithm for the same original
image (left). For the reconstruction samples, the evolution of the score through the generations is
shown on top (positive matching threshold marked with a horizontal dashed line), with the final
reconstructed normalized image and its corresponding iriscode shown below.
to determine a good set of parameter values for the reconstruction algorithm, re-
sulting in the following efficient operating point: population size N = 80, muta-
tion probability pm = 0:003, and block sizeR=HC=L = 22 pixels (i.e., each
normalized image is divided into H  L = 10 120 blocks).
It must be emphasized that these parameter values could be further optimized.
Furthermore, different strategies than those used here may be adopted in order
to implement each of the four rules described in Sect. 4 (i.e., elite, selection,
crossover and mutation). However, the above (or other) improvements related to
genetic algorithms are outside the scope of the present work, which is not focused
on the study and optimization of this search tool, but rather on the reversibility of
binary iris templates. For a more detailed description of different architectures for
genetic algorithms the reader is referred to [43, 52].
Once the parameter values of the reconstruction method were determined and
fixed, Masek’s matcher [48] was then used to compute the matching scores needed
by the optimization algorithm, in order to generate 5 different reconstructed im-
ages of each binary template (i.e., the algorithm was applied 5 times to reconstruct
and image from each iriscode), thus leading to a database of 5 420 = 2; 100 re-
constructed iris images (referred to as Reconstructed Biosecure DB in Fig. 4).
In order to determine the positive matching threshold  at which an iriscode
is considered to have been successfully reconstructed, the iris recognition system
performance was evaluated on the Biosecure DB. Genuine scores were computed
by matching the first sample of each user to the other 3 images of that same user
(i.e., 420 3 = 1; 260 genuine scores), while impostor scores were generated by
comparing the first iris of each user to the first sample of the remaining users in the
17
    
    
 
Figure 8: Four reconstructed iris images in pseudo-polar coordinates (top) all recovered from the
same original iris, and their corresponding denormalized images in cartesian coordinates used to
attack the VeriEye commercial matcher (bottom).
database (i.e., 420 419 = 175; 980 impostor scores). The two sets of similarity
scores are depicted in Fig. 6, where the selected positive matching threshold has
been highlighted with a vertical dotted line. We can observe that, below that value,
 = 0:3, the probability of having an impostor score is almost zero. Thus, two
iris images producing such a similarity score may be considered to come from the
same user.
In Fig. 7 three different reconstruction outcomes corresponding to a single real
iriscode are shown. Although the reconstructed patterns do not visually resemble
the original one and block artifacts are discernible, their corresponding iriscodes
are all very similar to each other and exhibit a high degree of resemblance with
the original. The visual dissimilarity between the original and the reconstructed
patterns may be explained by the absence of amplitude-related information in the
iriscodes. This leads to arbitrary amplitude values in the synthetically generated
samples which, nevertheless, present comparable phase information, resulting in
accurate iriscode reproductions. Above each reconstructed image in this figure,
the evolution of the score across iterations is shown. Marked with a horizontal
dashed line is the positive matching threshold  = 0:3.
6.2. Validation experiments: VeriEye
The iris images reconstructed in the development stage are used to test the
vulnerabilities of the VeriEye iris matcher (see the validation chart in Fig. 4). As
mentioned in Sect. 5.2, this system operates as a black-box, i.e., given an input,
it returns an output with no information about the internal algorithms used to get
that final result. Several remarks have to be made regarding the inputs and outputs
of VeriEye:
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 Inputs. Normalized iris samples in polar coordinates are not accepted by
VeriEye. The input to the system has to be an image containing a circular
iris in cartesian coordinates. For this reason, in order to attack the system,
all the reconstructed irides were reconverted into Cartesian coordinates as
shown in Fig. 8.
 Outputs. The system outputs a non-zero similarity score in case of a positive
match. When the matching threshold is not reached, a 0 is returned, thereby
making it difficult to launch a hill-climbing attack [27]. In case an error
occurs during the recognition process (most likely during the segmentation
stage), a negative score value is returned.
The performance of the attack is measured in terms of its Success Rate (SR),
which is defined as the percentage of successful attacks (As) out of the total car-
ried out (AT ), i.e., SR = As=AT  100. The key factors to compute the SR
are to define (a) what constitutes an attack, and (b) when an attack is considered
to be successful. In the experiments, three representative attacks will be taken
into account in order to estimate the performance of the proposed reconstruction
method:
1. Attack 1: 1 reconstructed image vs 1 real image. In this case the attack is
carried out on a 1-on-1 basis. That is, one reconstructed image is matched
against one real image and, if the resulting score exceeds the fixed match-
ing threshold, the attack is deemed to be successful. Two possible scenarios
may be distinguished in this case depending on the real image being at-
tacked:
(a) The real image being attacked is the original sample from which the
synthetic image was reconstructed. In this scenario the total number
of attacks performed which will be used to compute SR1a is AT1a =
420 5 = 2; 100.
(b) The real image being attacked is one of the other three samples of the
same user present in the Biosecure DB. For this experiment the total
number of attacks performed which will be used to compute SR1b is
AT1b = 420 3 5 = 6; 300.
2. Attack 2: 5 reconstructed images vs 1 real image. In this case all five
reconstructed images are matched against the real sample. The attack is
successful if at least one of the synthetic images matches against the real
image. This represents the most likely attack scenario analyzed in other
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FAR
SR (%) - VeriEye
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 81.2 66.7 96.2 92.8 96.7 86.7
0.05% 79.2 63.4 96.2 91.4 95.2 85.1
0.01% 77.3 60.9 95.2 90.9 93.8 83.6
0.0001% 69.0 49.1 92.8 82.8 82.9 75.3
Table 1: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered for the VeriEye matcher at the four
operating points tested.
related vulnerability studies [23]; here, the iriscode of a legitimate user in
the database is compromised and the intruder reconstructs multiple images
of the iris to try and break the system. The attacker will gain access if any
one of the reconstructed images results in a positive score.
The same two scenarios as in attack 1 can be considered here and, so, the
total number of attacks carried out in each scenario will be AT2a = 420 and
AT2b = 420  3 = 1; 260. The resulting success rates will be denoted as
SR2a and SR2b, respectively.
3. Attack 3: 5 reconstructed images vs average (4 real images). It is a com-
mon practice in many biometric recognition systems to match the test sam-
ple against several stored templates and return the average score. To emulate
this scenario, each reconstructed iris image is matched against the four sam-
ples of the real user available in the Biosecure DB. The attack is successful
if the average score due to of any of the five reconstructed images is higher
than the given operating threshold. Thus, in this case, the total number of
attacks performed in order to compute SR3 is AT3 = 420.
In general, the success of an attack is highly dependent on the False Accep-
tance Rate (FAR) of the system. Thus, the vulnerability of the system to the
attacks with the reconstructed images is evaluated at three operating points cor-
responding to FAR=0.1%, FAR=0.05%, and FAR=0.01%, which, according to
[53], correspond to a low, medium and high security application, respectively. For
completeness, the system is also tested at a very high security operating point
corresponding to FAR0.01%.
As was mentioned before, this commercial matcher does not return impostor
scores (i.e., they are always 0) which means that its FAR may not be statistically
computed on a given database. In order to fix the threshold for the different oper-
ating points, a deterministic equation is given in the documentation enclosed with
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FAR
SRn (%) - VeriEye
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
0.1% 1.9 5.3 13.3 24.8 50.9
0.05% 2.4 6.7 13.8 27.6 45.7
0.01% 3.8 6.2 13.8 28.1 43.3
0.0001% 7.6 6.7 21.9 24.7 31.9
Average 3.9 6.2 15.7 26.3 42.9
Table 2: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total 5 reconstructed images were
positively matched against the original iris image from whose iriscode they were reconstructed.
Results are given for the four operating points tested on VeriEye.
the system.
In the experiments, the system was unable to segment (i.e., reported an error)
1.4% of the real images in the Biosecure DB. This implies that, for these cases,
a sample from a legitimate user would have not been able to access the system.
Thus, the highest SR that can be reached by the attacks is 98.6%. Moreover, 0.5%
of the reconstructed images were not correctly segmented (these are regarded as
unsuccessful attacks).
Several observations can be made from the results of the validation experi-
ments carried out on VeriEye as shown in Table 1:
 The high performance of the proposed reconstruction algorithm is con-
firmed, reaching an average SR of around 85% for the three usual operating
points considered and over 95% for the most likely attacking scenario (i.e.,
SR2a).
 Even for an unrealistically high security point (i.e., FAR=0.0001%), the re-
constructed images would have, on average, almost 75% chances of break-
ing the system.
 As expected, it is more probable that the synthetic samples are positively
matched to the original image from which they were reconstructed than to
other real images of the same user (see the decrease in the SR between SR1a
vs SR1b and between SR2a vs SR2b).
 Even so, the reconstructed images still present a high probability of break-
ing the system even when the stored templates are not the one from which
they were recovered (average SR of SR1b and SR2b around 75%).
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 Furthermore, in the case of using several real samples of the user for veri-
fication (SR3), the reconstructed images are still able to access the system
94% of the time at the usual operating points, and for 80% of the attempts
in the extremely high operating point tested.
 Besides, a new possible vulnerability of iris recognition applications has
been raised, as the tested system positively matches images with a black
circle in the middle and a white background (such as the ones shown in
Fig. 8) that should by no means be recognized as an eye image.
The last observation emphasizes the need for incorporating some type of pre-
checking stage, prior to the localization and segmentation of the iris, in order to
confirm that the sample presented to the system is really that of an eye, and not
some simple iris-like image.
The results presented in Table 1 confirm the first objective set in the present
work: iris patterns may be recovered from their iriscodes, and the reconstructed
images represent a threat to the integrity of automatic recognition systems.
Recall that the second goal of the work is to determine the feasibility of gen-
erating multiple synthetic iris patterns with iriscodes very similar to a real one. In
order to address this point, results from experiment 2.a (i.e., all 5 synthetic images
are compared against the original image) are presented in Table 2 from a different
perspective. In this case we report in each column the percentage of attacks in
which only n out of the 5 reconstructed images (with n = 1; : : : ; 5) were posi-
tively matched to the original real image. In each case, the total number of attacks
performed is ATn = 420 and the success rate is denoted as SRn.
Averaging over the four operating points, all five reconstructed images were
positively matched to the original image in 42.9% of the cases. This increases
to 69.2% if we consider n = f4; 5g, and to 84.9% when taking into account
n = f3; 4; 5g. These results confirm the ability of the proposed probabilistic
reconstruction method to generate multiple iris patterns that match successfully
against one specific iriscode. As can be seen in Table 1, this ability gives the
proposed method a much higher attacking potential than deterministic algorithms
that can only generate one image from each iriscode: the success rate increases by
around 27% on an average when several reconstructions of the iris image are avail-
able (i.e., attack 2: 1vs5) compared to the case in which only one reconstructed
sample is used to access the system (i.e., attack 1: 1vs1).
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FAR=0.01%
SR (%) - VeriEye
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
 = 0:3 77.3 60.9 95.2 90.9 93.8 83.6
 = 0:4 5.1 0.0 9.4 8.6 8.8 7.9
Table 3: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered for the VeriEye matcher at the operating
point FAR=0.01% for two different reconstruction thresholds.
6.3. Validation experiments: Variation of the reconstruction threshold
As explained in Sect. 6.1, in the previous validation experiments, the recon-
struction threshold was set to  = 0:3 since, as seen in Fig. 6, it is very unlikely
that an impostor score falls within the range of this value (impostor scores for the
development system are typically below 0.4.) In the present set of experiments,
this reconstruction threshold is modified in order to gain a deeper understanding
of the proposed reconstruction approach. In particular, the objective of these ex-
periments is to: i) determine the impact of the reconstruction threshold selection
on the success rate of the studied attacks, and ii) establish if it is possible to obtain
a perfect reconstruction following the proposed scheme (i.e., generate an iris im-
age with the exact same iriscode as the original sample), and analyze the increase
in the computational cost for perfect reconstruction.
In order to accomplish the first objective, the reconstruction threshold was
set to  = 0:4, at the lower bound of the impostor scores range as shown in
Fig. 6. This means that the reconstructed images will be less similar to the original
counterparts compared to the ones generated in Sect. 6.2 where the threshold was
fixed at  = 0:3. Therefore, the SR of the attacks carried out with these new
synthetic images should be lower than that achieved in the previous experiments.
In Table 3 we show the comparative performance of the attack for the two con-
sidered reconstruction thresholds, where we observe that, as expected, the success
rate decreases from over 90% in the best reconstruction case ( = 0:3), to less
than 10% when the threshold is increased. For clarity, the comparison has just
been established for the operating point corresponding to FAR=0.5%.
These results show that selecting a better reconstruction threshold results in a
higher success rate for the attack at the cost of a higher computational cost (i.e.,
time) to generate each reconstructed sample.
In order to determine this increase in the computational cost (i.e., objective
ii for this set of experiments), three “best possible” reconstructions were gen-
erated from five randomly selected irises. To reach these “best possible” syn-
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Figure 9: Three “best possible” reconstructions reached with the proposed algorithm (right) for the
same original image (left). For the reconstruction samples, the evolution of the score through the
generations is shown on top, with the final reconstructed normalized image and its corresponding
iriscode shown below.
thetic images, the parameters of the algorithm were set as follows: population size
N = 150, mutation probability pm = 0:003, and block size R=H C=L = 1 1
pixels (i.e., each normalized image is divided into H  L = 20  240 blocks,
which means that each pixel is considered as a single block). No reconstruc-
tion threshold was fixed and the algorithm iterated 10,000 times to determine the
lowest threshold that can be reached by the proposed method (i.e., best possible
reconstruction).
In Fig. 9, we show three optimal reconstructions of one original iris, together
with their corresponding iriscodes and the evolution of the matching score through
the iterations. It can be seen that the best images generated by the algorithm pro-
duce a score close to 0.1. This means that, following this approach, although we
can generate extremely good reconstructions, it is unlikely that the exact iriscode
can be recovered, mainly due to two factors: on the one hand, GAs do not guar-
antee finding the global minimum of the function being optimized and, on the
other hand, finding an identical iriscode would require a larger population with
sufficient diversity (which in this case is limited by the amount of synthetic ini-
tialization data).
We note that each of these best possible reconstructions took around 12 exe-
cution hours, compared to the few minutes taken when the threshold was set to
 = 0:3 (also with a smaller population and smaller individuals). These results
reinforce the need to reach a trade-off between computational cost and quality of
the reconstructed samples.
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Figure 10: Examples of reconstructed images used in the appearance evaluation experiments.
7. Results: Appearance
Although the primary objective of this work is to determine if automatic iris
recognition systems may be deceived by the reconstructed iris images (see results
in Sect. 6), in this section we statistically evaluate the visual realism of the recon-
structed iris images from a human point of view.
Firstly, the reconstructed samples are given a more realistic appearance by
suppressing the block artifacts. To this end, the synthetic iris images are smoothed
using standard image processing tools (Gaussian filtering); transformed into the
cartesian space; and then embedded in a real eye image. Some examples of the
outcome of this process are shown in Fig. 10. It has to be noted here that real eye
images are being introduced for the first time in the experimental protocol with the
only purpose of hosting the synthetic samples, in order to obtain a fair comparison
between the two classes (real and synthetic). The smoothing operation carried out
on the reconstructed images barely affects matching performance, which remains
as shown in Sect. 6 (with negligible variations).
In order to compute statistically significant results, a set of 100 randomly cho-
sen real and reconstructed samples (50 of each class) was given to two groups
of people: i) non-experts, comprising 25 subjects with naive knowledge on iris
recognition and ii) experts, consisting of 15 researchers working in the iris field.
Both groups were asked to mark each specimen from 0 (fully synthetic) to 4
(somewhat synthetic) and from 6 (somewhat real) to 10 (fully real) according to
their impression after a quick inspection of the iris. The maximum time permitted
to complete the experiment was 15 minutes.
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Non-Expert Participants (25)
Error Rates (%) Average Score Average Time
FSR FRR ACE Real Synthetic (minutes)
36.2 39.3 37.7 5.61 4.23 9.7
Table 4: Error rates, average score and average time of the 25 non-expert participants in the ap-
pearance evaluation experiment. FSR stands for False Synthetic Rate, FRR for False Real Rate,
and ACE for Average Classification Error.
Two types of errors can be committed in the classification task: i) a real iris
is marked as synthetic (0-4), measured by the False Synthetic Rate (FSR), and ii)
a synthetic iris is marked as a real sample (ranked 6-10), measured by the False
Real Rate (FRR). The final Average Classification Error (ACE) is defined as ACE
= (FSR + FRR)/2. These error rates are presented in the first three columns of
Tables 4 and 5. In the next two columns we give the average score given by all
subjects to the 50 real and synthetic samples. Finally the average time taken to
complete the experiment is shown.
From the results presented in Table 4 we can see that over one third of the
irides (38%) were misclassified by non-expert participants, proving the real-like
appearance of synthetic samples (a random classifier would present an ACE of
50%). It should also be noticed that both error rates FSR and FRR are very close
(36.2% and 39.3%, respectively) which means that the number of mistaken real
and synthetic samples is very similar and that it is not easier to distinguish one
class over the other. Furthermore, the average score given by the participants to
real (5.61) and synthetic specimens (4.23) is quite close, reinforcing the idea that
human subjects have a very similar perception of both types of irides.
As expected, the error rates reported in Table 5 for the experts group (close to
10%) are much lower than that of the non-expert group. These results show that,
although it would be very difficult for synthetic irides to deceive an expert after
close inspection, he can still make some errors when a non-detailed examination
is done. This confirms their relatively high level of similarity to real samples.
Finally, we remark that the average time taken by the participants to carry out
the task was a little less than 10 minutes (around 6 seconds per iris), which is
consistent with the overall objective of the experiment of not making a detailed
analysis of each iris, but rather estimating the general visual appearance of these
samples after a brief inspection.
26
Expert Participants (15)
Error Rates (%) Average Scoring Average Time
FSR FRR ACE Real Synthetic (minutes)
9.0 7.6 8.3 7.5 1.9 8.6
Table 5: Error rates, average score and average time of the 15 expert participants in the appearance
evaluation experiment. FSR stands for False Synthetic Rate, FRR for False Real Rate, and ACE
for Average Classification Error.
8. Results: Quality Assessment
In order to complement the human-aided results presented in Sect. 7, a coarse
estimation of the quality of the genuine and reconstructed samples from the per-
spective of automatic recognition systems was performed. For this purpose, both
real and synthetic images were compared in terms of their quality.
From a biometric point of view, the quality of iris images can be assessed by
measuring one of the following properties: i) motion blur, ii) occlusion, iii) con-
trast, and iv) other factors, including the image focus or the dilation of the pupil. A
number of sources of information can be used to measure these properties includ-
ing the high frequency power spectrum, angle information provided by directional
filters, pixel intensity of certain eye regions, or different ratios comparing the iris
area to that of the image, and the diameters of the iris and pupil. Iris quality can
be assessed by either analyzing the image in a holistic manner, or combining the
quality from local blocks in the image.
The four parameters used in this study are:
 Motion: Frequency Distribution Rates (FDR1 and FDR2) [54]. These
are different combinations of three different parameters which consider, re-
spectively, the power of the low (F1), medium (F2), and high (F3) frequen-
cies (computed according to the 2D Fourier Spectrum) of two local regions
situated on the sides of the pupil. For the present work, two different fea-
tures have been considered: FDR1 = F2=(F1 + F3) and FDR2 = F3.
 Occlusion: Region of Interest (RoI) [55]. It analyzes the average value of
the pixels in the region of interest, located 50 pixels above the pupil center.
 Contrast: Local Contrast (LC) [56]. This quality feature is adapted from
the technique presented in [56] for occlusion estimation. A square region
covering the iris and pupil is divided into a 10  10 cell grid. Each cell is
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Figure 11: Distributions for the four quality features considered in the quality assessment study
for the three databases used in the experiments.
assigned a value which corresponds to the power of its medium frequencies.
The final quality measure is obtained by taking a ratio between the number
of cells whose values fall between 20 and 60, and the total number of cells.
The four quality-related features described above, each measuring a different
image property, were computed for all the samples of i) the Biosecure Database,
ii) the Synthetic Database (SDB) comprising of simple iris-like images with a
white background (see Fig. 8), and iii) the synthetic iris images embedded in a
real eye used in the appearance experiments described in Sect. 7.
The results for the four quality features applied to the three databases are de-
picted in Fig. 11. As was expected, for all four measures, the quality of the em-
bedded synthetic irides is closer to that of the genuine samples than the raw re-
constructed images. Nevertheless, there is a fairly good separation between these
distributions, which suggests that quality assessment may be a suitable approach
for developing a biometric-based countermeasure against the disclosed threat, as
has already been achieved for other modalities [57]. However, due to the detailed
experimentation and analysis that would be required, such a study falls out of the
scope of the present contribution and will be the topic of future research.
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9. Conclusions
This work has shown that the phase information summarized in iriscodes is
sufficient to generate synthetic iris-like images with very similar binary templates
to that of the original iris pattern. The experimental findings indicate that an
eventual attack against iris matchers using such reconstructed images would have
a very high chance of success. Such an attack presupposes that (a) the system
stores unencrypted templates (or the attacker is able to override this protection)
and that (b) synthetic iris samples can be input to the matcher. Since iriscodes
only encode phase-related data of the original iris image and discard the amplitude
information [8], there are visual differences between the reconstructed iris and the
original iris. However, results indicate that it is quite likely to deceive a non-
expert human observer with the reconstructed samples even though the synthetic
greyscale iris patterns are not a fully accurate reproduction of the original patterns.
The experimental findings have also shown the ability of the proposed proba-
bilistic approach to reconstruct not just one, but multiple synthetic samples from
a given iriscode. This not only significantly increases the success rate of the at-
tack compared to methods that can generate only one synthetic sample from an
iriscode, but it also opens up the possibility of other applications besides inverse
biometrics such us its use for privacy preserving purposes.
Biometric samples are personal data and different privacy concerns have arisen
regarding their distribution and protection [58]. The proposed reconstruction
method is able to generate synthetic iris patterns visually different to the origi-
nal (see Fig. 7) which are, nevertheless, positively matched to the user’s identity.
This means that the synthetic samples may be considered as an alternative repre-
sentation of the user’s identity and, as such, may be stored in the database thereby
avoiding possible privacy issues (e.g., deducing gender, age or ethnicity from the
original iris images).
Furthermore, the work has reinforced the need for including template protec-
tion schemes in commercial iris systems as well as for adopting a verification
strategy that confirms if the biometric samples presented to the system are those
of a genuine eye and not that of a digital or physical artifact of the iris.
It may be argued that attacks such as the one considered in this work can be
successful only when the template stored in the database is compromised. This
may be difficult (although possible) in classical biometric systems where the en-
rolled templates are kept in a centralized database. In this case, the attacker would
have to access the database and extract the information, or intercept the communi-
cation channel when the stored template is released for matching. But the threat is
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heightened in Match-on-Card (MoC) applications where an individual’s biomet-
ric template is stored in a smartcard possessed by the person. Such applications
are rapidly growing due to several appealing characteristics such as scalability
and privacy [59]. Similarly, biometric data is being stored in many official docu-
ments such as the new biometric passport [60], some national ID cards [61], the
US FIPS-201 Personal Identity Verification inititatives (PIV) [62] and the ILO
Seafarers Identity Card Program [63]. In spite of the clear advantages that these
type of applications offer, templates are more likely to be compromised as it is
easier for the attacker to have physical access to the storage device and, as has
already been demonstrated [64], fraudulently obtain the information contained in-
side. This makes MoC systems potentially more vulnerable to the type of threat
described in this article especially when the biometric data is stored without any
type of encryption [62], or printed in the clear on plastic cards as 2D barcodes
[63].
Thus, there is an acute need to deflect the type of attack outlined in this article.
This can be accomplished using two complementary approaches:
 Prevention. Here the goal is to avoid the users’ templates from being com-
promised, for example by securely storing biometric data using encrypted
templates [39, 65] or protecting the communication channels through en-
cryption [66].
 Protection. Here the goal is to minimize the probability of a successful
attack even when a template is compromised. This could be accomplished
by using biometric-based countermeasures to distinguish synthetic images
from real iris images or to employ liveness-detection techniques [67].
Research work, such as the one presented in this article, or previous studies
dealing with other modalities like fingerprint [23, 3] or face [4], bring to the fore
the difficulty in estimating the amount of information present within a biometric
trait and the issue of biometric template generation.
Furthermore, from a security perspective, we believe that these examples may
serve as a wake-up call for vendors and developers to be aware of the poten-
tial risks of not securing biometric templates, as is the case in some operational
systems already installed in sensitive areas. There is an urgent need to design ef-
fective countermeasures that minimize the effects of these threats and increase the
confidence of the end users in this rapidly emerging technology.
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